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TRUST, BUT VERIFY: REAGAN, GORBACHEV, AND THE
INF TREATY
By William D. Watson
Department of History
william.d.watson@wmich.edu
“Every man, woman and child lives under a nuclear sword of Damocles, hanging by the slen
derest of threads, capable of being cut at any moment by miscalculation, or accident, or by
madness. The weapons of war must be abolished before they abolish us.1”
 John F. Kennedy
On December 8, 1987, President Ronald Reagan and General Secretary Mikhail
Gorbachev signed the Intermediate Nuclear Force Treaty (INF), which aimed to eliminate
short and medium range nuclear weapons from their respective national arsenals. It was a
small but significant step in the long process of easing Cold War tensions between the United
States and the Soviet Union. However, when Reagan first took office in 1981, this outcome
was far from inevitable, and by the end of 1983, relations between the United States and the
Soviet Union were as fragile as they had been since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. The
potential for brinksmanship endured well into Reagan’s tenure, despite previous efforts at
détente by both governments. The great success of Reagan and Gorbachev was their agree
ment in Geneva, Switzerland in 1985 to put aside all other policy issues and agree that, since
it cannot be won, nuclear war must never be fought. This may see to be an obvious conclu
sion, but to put such an agreement into practice required eliminating the means of deterrence.
This paper is a discussion of the relationship between the deployment of two types of
intermediate (medium) range missile systems in Europe, how leaders on both sides viewed
the situation, and how the potential use of such weapons affected superpower relations during
the last decade of the Cold War. These events led to the signing of the INF Treaty. I argue
that the INF Treaty represents an agreement that the prospect of intercontinental annihilation
trumps the reality of regional provocation. There is no need for short or medium range nucle
ar weapons when mutually assured destruction (MAD) is the foundation of a global nuclear
peace. As a result, both leaders agreed to a verification schedule backed up by the potential
for unilateral nuclear action if the treaty was violated. By eliminating an entire class of nucle
ar weapons, and significantly reducing the total number in existence, Reagan and Gorbachev
decreased the likelihood of a nuclear domino effect exchange whereby a tactical or medium
range attack might lead to fullscale retaliation. In a modern retelling of the old paradox, to
secure lawful enforcement of the INF Treaty, which aimed at preventing war, both nations
reserved the right of mutually assured destruction.
The most recent Cold War scholarship tends to portray the positive personal relation
ship between Reagan and Gorbachev as key to building trust and understanding between the
US and Soviet governments. Gorbachev is further singled out for his role in the partnership
for two reasons. The first reason is chronological. Gorbachev was the last leader of the Sovi
et Union, and his time in office began after Reagan had already been elected for the second
time. By this reasoning, Gorbachev is the difference maker because change happened on his
watch. Similar arguments have been made about Reagan, too. This line of thinking is based
on the idea that Reagan and Gorbachev were simply in office at the culmination of decades’
1 John F. Kennedy, Address to the United Nations General Assembly September 25, 1961,
American Rhetoric Online Speech Bank, http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/
jfkunitednations.htm (accessed January 27, 2011).
The Hilltop Review, Spring 2011

23

William D. Watson

worth of policies on both sides, the totality of which initiated a shockingly abrupt end to the
Cold War under Gorbachev, and the breakup of the former Soviet empire less three years
after Reagan’s successor George H. W. Bush took office.2
The second reason Gorbachev’s contribution is emphasized is more complicated to
isolate, but is more or less a result of Gorbachev’s personality, his intellect, and an openness to
change. In describing the atmosphere just after the Geneva Summit, preeminent Cold War
historian John Lewis Gaddis wrote:
Two years earlier [Yuri] Andropov had thought Reagan capable of launch
ing a surprise attack. Now Gorbachev felt confident that the United States
would never do this. Reagan’s position had not changed: he had always
asked Soviet leaders to ‘trust me.’ After meeting Reagan, Gorbachev began
to do so.” 3
By arguing that Reagan “had not changed,” Gaddis implicitly makes the case that
Gorbachev was the only one of the two who could break the deadlock of mutual antagonism.
On Gorbachev as an individual, Gaddis wrote, “He chose love over fear, violating Machiavel
li’s advice for princes and thereby ensuring that he ceased to be one. It made little sense in
traditional geopolitical terms. But it did make him the most deserving recipient ever of the
Nobel Peace Prize.”4
Historian Melvyn P. Leffler also portrays Gorbachev as the central figure, highlight
ing his intellect and internationalism. During the 1970s Gorbachev worked for the Com
munist Party on improving the Soviet agricultural infrastructure, which allowed him the rare
freedom to travel outside the country, and, in particular, to the West. Gorbachev, Leffler ex
plains, “Liked talking to foreigners, exchanging ideas, and making comparisons between his
way of life and theirs. He felt pride in the Soviet educational system. He believed his coun
trymen had better access to medical care and superior public transport system. But his travels
abroad bred doubt.”5 Leffler describes Gorbachev as “extremely personable and engaging, but
he was also tough and intelligent.” His intellect allowed him to “recognize from the outset,
that his domestic goals could not be achieved without readjusting Soviet foreign policy.” 6
In this observation, Leffler and Gaddis are in agreement. Gaddis argues that Gorbachev’s
open mindedness freed him to “[sweep] away communism’s emphasis on the class struggle,
its insistence on the inevitability of a world proletarian revolution, and hence its claims of his
torical infallibility.” 7 Gorbachev’s curiosity did not go unnoticed by Western leaders.
2 Historians Melvyn P. Leffler and John Lewis Gaddis discuss the importance of Gorbachev
as an individual within the Soviet system based on his unique combination of intelligence and
opportunity. Leffler and Gaddis each note that Gorbachev’s access to education, and foreign
travel in particular, allowed him to make comparisons between life in the Soviet Union and
life abroad. The observations Gorbachev made when traveling spurred his openness to
change in an effort to raise the standard of living within the Soviet Union. After having seen
three consecutive Soviet leaders die in office, Ronald Reagan finally found an enthusiastic
negotiating partner in Gorbachev. Both Leffler and Gaddis argue that the two men truly liked
one another. See: John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin
Press, 2005) and Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet
Union, and the Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007).
3 John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Press, 2005), 231.
4 Gaddis, The Cold War, 257.
5 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 370.
6 Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind, 381 and 376.
7 Gaddis, The Cold War, 197.
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After meeting Gorbachev in 1984, British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher famously ob
served, “This is a man with whom I could do business.”8
Gaddis and Leffler are representative of revisionist Cold War historians who have
made the leap to postrevisionism. The opening of Eastern European archives, in addition to a
running stream of memoirs, and the release of Soviet internal documents for public consump
tion, has infused a tangible sense of excitement to recent Cold War research. Today’s scholars
have much greater access to information than ever before. Combined with a new emphasis on
globalization in writing American History, that access has fed a growing number of Cold War
reexaminations.
Historian Jeremi Suri has also written about the end of the Cold War. In a 2002 arti
cle, Suri explained the end of the Cold War by borrowing a concentric circle analogy from
James Joll. In his description, Suri noted that Reagan was, “the man largely responsible for
the crisis atmosphere” of 1983, but that after a series of tense events throughout the year,
“Reagan made a decisive turn toward improved SovietAmerican relations.”9 Like Gaddis and
Leffler, however, Suri also holds a special place for Gorbachev, arguing that:
Gorbachev understood that his hopes for improving the Soviet economy and
the quality of domestic life in general required a peaceful international con
text. Continued Cold War competition would perpetuate that social stagna
tion he wanted to eliminate. Only extensive and unprecedented EastWest
cooperation could permit the allocation of resources necessary for domestic
restructuring (perestroika).10
Suri framed the relationship as one between two individuals who want the same thing, but
approach it from two different directions. Reagan is the paranoid ideologue always searching
for peace through strength, while Gorbachev is the pragmatist, willing to expend political cap
ital in order to bring about change.
What all of these historians have in common is the belief that Reagan and Gorbachev
were both men of their time and circumstance. They were both moral and rational, and they
sincerely liked one another. The absence of pretension in combination with an open style of
dialogue helped foster an honest rapport between the two, which in turn helped thaw Cold
War tension from the top down. Their meeting, however, was far from inevitable, and the
path leading to the INF signing date in December 1987 was fraught with near misses and real
tragedy. From Reagan’s point of view, the Soviet SS20 deployment during the late 1970s
was a clear attempt to tip the balance of power in Europe away from the West. Once in office,
he worked to respond multilaterally through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
by supporting a plan to match the Soviet nuclear threat.
First Mover Advantage
Proper balance is the key to enduring power relationships. For Europe in the early
years of the Cold War, balance was maintained by measuring the overwhelming number of
conventional Soviet forces against the American “nuclear umbrella” which protected NATO
allies. That is, if leaders in the Kremlin decided to challenge the status quo by advancing mili
tarily against Western Europe, American and NATO leaders could retaliate with nuclear
weapons to offset their numerical disadvantage versus the oncoming force. However, this
balance was based upon the idea that the Soviet military would be the aggressor. From Mos
cow’s point of view, NATO leaders’ first strike option was always nuclear, which meant a
Soviet conventional force advantage was only as good as an enemy’s reluctance to use nuclear
8 Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), 463.
9 Jeremi Suri, “Explaining the End of the Cold War: A New Historical Consensus?,” Journal
of Cold War Studies Vol 4 No 4 (Fall 2002): 6092.
10 Suri, Explaining, 78.
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weapons.
As weapons technology improved during the Cold War, this conceptual balance itself
was shaken by the introduction of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs). Since it was no
longer necessary to be anywhere near a target in order to hit it, conventional forces were no
longer a firststrike option when the expected retaliation is overwhelming missile retaliation.
Under the threat of intercontinental MAD, the number of divisions the Soviets had in the Euro
pean theatre was irrelevant, since ICBMs could be used as the great equalizer of the 20th centu
ry. The debate over what constituted “balance” and “security” in Europe, and whether or not
the two were linked, was an ongoing one throughout the Cold War. One group of historians
put is this way:
Thirty years of successful containment in Europe had never resolved the
perennially divisive military dilemmas inherent in the [NATO] alliance. The
heavy reliance on nuclear weapons, as the only effective and affordable de
terrent and guarantee of peace, placed Europe completely under the decision
making power of the United States. Washington alone would determine
how Europe would be defended during any hostilities.11
The limited technology of jet bombers and artillery helped secure the initial NATO view of the
balance, but considering the accelerated rate of research and development in the postWorld
War II world, it could never last.
The steadily increasing total number of nuclear weapons led to another serious Cold
War concern: antiballistic missile technology (ABM). The desire to possess a reliable ABM
system is directly related to the size of an enemy’s nuclear arsenal. If one side believed it
could eliminate the other’s ability to counter attack by launching a first strike, then it would be
rational to strike first. It is the ability to retaliate which maintains balance. If one nation be
gan developing the ability to defend against a first strike, it would be in the best interest of a
belligerent nation to launch an attack before the defense system was operational. Otherwise,
once the defender’s shield is in place, they could strike with impunity. This is the logic behind
the AntiBallistic Missile Treaty of 1972 banning such technology, signed by Richard Nixon
and Soviet Premier Leonid Brezhnev. The ABM treaty represents the spirit of détente, a less
ening of tension between the superpowers. The US interpretation of détente was overtly shat
tered during the Jimmy CarterLeonid Brezhnev years by Soviet interventionism in the Third
World, and by the time Reagan took office in January 1981, there were proxy wars in Afghani
stan, Nicaragua, and Angola.
In Europe during the détente period, Soviet leaders chose to deploy a new kind of
missile, the SS20. Its capabilities were astonishing: the SS20 had a target range of three
thousand miles, carried multiple nuclear warheads, and was capable of being launched from
highly mobile platforms. The SS20 deployment was a strategic move, a threat, that if either
the US or any of its NATO allies attacked the Soviet Union or any of its Warsaw Pact allies,
massive retaliation could be a reality for any or all of them, some within just a few minutes. In
order to make their threat credible, the Soviet government made sure that the deployment was
observable. There is no benefit to developing weapons of deterrence if the enemy you hope to
deter cannot confirm the danger. The threat was then backed up by a promise that the SS20s
were defensive in nature, but would be launched in retaliation of a nuclear first strike against
the Soviet Union or any of the Warsaw Pact nations. The promise of retaliation is a promise to
do something that a rational or moral leader would not normally do: participate in nuclear war.
11 Norman A. Graebner, Richard Dean Burns, and Joseph M. Siracusa, Reagan, Bush, Gor
bachev: Revisiting the End of the Cold War (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International,
2008), 23.
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The promise to use SS20s was an observable, credible threat to regional security in
Europe, and the world. In deploying the SS20, the Soviet government shifted the balance. In
1981, former National Security Advisor McGeorge Bundy wrote:
Experts have been found to doubt the comfort for Europe in each successive
American doctrine, whether of massive retaliation, or flexible response, or
the seamless NATO Triad. And Soviet threats of all sorts, political and mil
itary, conventional and nuclear, actual and hypothetical, have intermittently
strained the balance. It endures.12
By November 1987, Moscow had deployed 470 medium range missiles, capable of striking
from North Africa to Scandinavia, from either side of the Ural Mountains.13
Independent of the Soviet development of the SS20, American military contractors
designed a nearly equivalent missile system: the Pershing II. The history of the Pershing II
research and development dates back to 1974, but the real import of the system was not rele
vant until 1979 when NATO approved basing of the Pershing IIs in West Germany in re
sponse to the SS20 threat. However, two years passed before the program entered the pro
duction phase. By that time the Soviet military was integrating two new SS20s per week into
their arsenal.14
When viewed from the Soviet perspective, the Pershing II system was just as unset
tling as the SS20 system was to NATO allies. The Pershing II is also a groundmobile, sur
face to surface, nuclear weapon system, but has a range of only one thousand miles. By de
ploying the Pershing IIs in West Germany, the target zone included every Warsaw Pact na
tion, as well as the highest concentration of Soviet civilians (west of the Urals), and Moscow
itself. Former Secretary of State Alexander Haig recalled that Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei
Gromyko, “made the expected point that the SS20s and other Soviet nuclear systems targeted
on Europe did not threaten US territory, but the Pershing II would be within range of major
Soviet cities.”15 This situation is similar to putting the American eastern seaboard within range
of Soviet nuclear forces which Washington argued was unacceptable during the Cuban Mis
sile Crisis.
Because of the uneven research and development timelines of the two missile sys
tems, the actual deployment of the Pershing II can be viewed, by logic of chronology, as a
reaction to the deployment of the SS20s, but this deployment was not guaranteed.

12 McGeorge Bundy, “Strategic Deterrence Thirty Years Later: What Has Changed?,” in The
Future Of Strategic Deterrence, ed. Christopher Bertram, (Hamden, CT: Archon Books,
1981), 10.
13 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Establishment of the Data Base for the
Treaty Between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States of America on
the Elimination of Their IntermediateRange and ShorterRange Missiles, December 8, 1987,
http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/inf/text/inf3.htm (accessed December 14, 2010). This docu
ment includes information on the total number, and the maximum range, of both American
and Soviet missiles, including the SS20 and Pershing II. The geographic range mentioned in
this paper simply fits the listed range capabilities.
14 Alexander Haig, Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: MacMillan,
1984), 225. Considering this statistic comes from a former US Secretary of State, it should be
read with some caution. However, the Memorandum of Understanding which accompanies
the INF Treaty confirms that a rate of two deployments per week, starting in the late 1970s,
could add up to the total of 470 by November 1987 outlined therein.
15 Haig, Caveat, 231.
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There are, of course, at least two ways to react to any sequential move situation: action or inac
tion. Since the research and development of the two missile systems was independent, their
existence alone cannot be considered as a reaction to the other. In military terms, Washington
wanted the option of peaceful destruction of the SS20s as a military threat. In political terms,
by arguing for the elimination of the SS20s, Washington was asking Moscow to retract its
retaliatory promise implicit in the threat, which would return the balance in Europe back to the
predétente status quo. In order to achieve that end, Washington had the choice to respond to
the SS20 deployment by either basing Pershing IIs in Western Europe (action, or hard line
approach), or relying on the existing countermeasures already in place (inaction, soft line ap
proach) and negotiate the elimination of the SS20s from the existing position. The debate
over how to return to the NATO preferred definition of balance in Europe split Reagan’s cabi
net.
Soft Line vs. Hard Line
The soft line approach to removal of the SS20 threat was called the Zero Option.
The debate over the Zero Option effectively pitted Secretary of State Alexander Haig against
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. In his memoir, Haig wrote that:
The fatal flaw in the Zero Option as a basis for negotiations was that it was
not negotiable. It was absurd to expect the Soviets to dismantle an existing
force of 1,100 warheads, which they had already put into the field at the cost
of billions of rubles, in exchange for a promise from the United States not to
deploy a missile force that we had not yet begun to build and that had
aroused such violent controversy in Western Europe. Caspar Weinberger, in
his enthusiasm for the Zero Option, could not concede this point.16
Haig suggested an aggressive response to the SS20s as quickly as possible. If the US govern
ment were able to counter with deployment of the Pershing II system in a short period of time,
then the Soviet government would be forced to react in kind, continuing the cycle of the exist
ing arms race. By emphasizing the financial cost of SS20 deployment over the danger it rep
resented as a weapon, Haig shows that he was willing to accept the status quo MAD in order to
fight the Soviets economically. He felt that Moscow could no longer match the US in financ
ing the Cold War arms race, and this was a clear opportunity to attack the irrationality of their
economic system, rather than the rationality of their leaders. Haig felt that the only way the
Soviets would not cheat a verification treaty was if the US had a comparable threat to the SS
20 in the field.17
Early in the debate, Weinberger clearly saw the situation differently. Like Haig, he
never doubted that the Kremlin would need some sort of incentive to destroy its SS20s, but
Weinberger felt that the mere existence of a comparable missile system would be enough, and
that actual deployment would be unnecessary. However, Weinberger’s position was contin
gent on two points. He writes:
By the first of the two, the Soviets would not only remove the SS20s, but
would actually destroy them. That was important because the SS20s were
mobile. The other essential, I felt, to any treaty on any subject with the So
viet Union, was through onsite verification. Meanwhile, I did not feel we
should stop our work on the Pershing IIs or the cruise missiles. I felt that
there would be no possibility of the Soviets agreeing to take out their SS
20s, unless, and until, they had the kind of inducement that deployment of
16 Haig, Caveat, 229.
17 Haig, Caveat, 229.
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

Trust, but Verify

28

the Pershing IIs would bring.18
Weinberger felt that existing systems were enough deterrence in the field, but wanted to pre
pare for, rather than commit to, future missile deployment. He had faith that submarinebased
missiles, F111 bombers, and InterContinental Ballistic Missile systems (ICBMs) would be
enough incentive for Moscow to back down from this particular engagement, provided that
Washington continued moving forward with the research and development of the Pershing
II.19
Haig warned Reagan that the Zero Option, “was a mistake that he would have to
modify within the year.”20 Weinberger was pleased that Reagan at first favored the Zero Op
tion, but later recalled, “Haig need not have feared, because to the President’s disappointment
and mine, the immediate reaction was almost all negative.”21
If the Zero Option best represents the soft line approach, then the NATO Dual Track
policy best represents the hard line point of view, with a caveat. The Dual Track was an at
tempt to combine both military (hard line) and political (soft line) policies. Track one was a
direct deployment response to the SS20. In December 1979, as noted above, NATO leaders
approved the basing of Pershing II missiles in West Germany, and ground launched cruise
missiles (GLCMs) in the Netherlands, Belgium, England, and Italy. In December 1981, the
Pershing II program entered the production phase, and by June 1984, deployment of the first
Pershing II battalion was complete.
Track two was an accompanying policy to Track one. Throughout the latter process
Western leaders maintained an open position on negotiating the elimination of SS20s with
leaders from the Kremlin. By leaving the Soft Line approach open, both Reagan administra
tion and NATO officials could claim to be advocates of pragmatic arms control at the least,
and benevolent arms reduction at the best. If successful, the Two Track policy would achieve
the NATO definition of balance either way. From the Soviet point of view, this was an ag
gressive move which put Moscow at risk of total destruction within ten minutes of a launch.
The Public Sphere
The Dual Track policy ostensibly showed that leaders in both Washington and
NATO saw no change in the overall precarious nature of Cold War deterrence. The ultimate
deterrence was the ability to retaliate against any first strike, whether it occurred in Europe or
elsewhere. However, this position was terrifying to many Europeans, as well as people who
held philosophical disagreements with the existence of nuclear weapons altogether. The only
way to test if Washington would sacrifice New York for Paris is for Paris to be destroyed first
– every time.
Since both Soviet and American governments made threats of full scale retaliation if
an ally were attacked, MAD had to be considered a credible threat because of the cost of test
ing an opponent’s resolve. This line of thinking put an extraordinary amount of pressure on
the US government to back up its allies with independent deterrents. If Western Europe was a
target, then NATO allies needed to be able to strike back independently of the US, hence the
necessity of NATO countries having Pershing II missiles and GLCMs on site. The question
of whether or not American leaders were willing to risk New York to defend Paris could be
eliminated by giving NATO leaders the ability to retaliate on their own. Failure by NATO to
retaliate, or the incapability of retaliation, could still be overridden by the potential of Wash
18 Caspar Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York:
Warner Books, 1990), 337.
19 Weinberger, Fighting, 340.
20 Haig, Caveat, 229.
21 Weinberger, Fighting, 341. Italics in the original.
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ington to strike on their behalf with ICBMs. The basing of Pershing II missiles in Western
Europe merely reset the regional balance of terror.
Palpable concerns over the use of nuclear weapons drove many people to demon
strate against their very existence. By 1982 people were marching by the thousands in Chica
go, and hundreds of thousands in New York. The Catholic Bishops of America spoke out
against the arms race as immoral. And by the end of 1982, the antinuclear movement was
active in fortythree states.22 Europeans were just as concerned, if not more so, considering
first strike possibilities. In just one month, the number of protesters in Bonn, London, and
Paris numbered over half a million people.23
A visual representation of the nuclear freeze movement was published in newspapers
across the US in July 1985. The image shows a small, single missile silhouette representing
all the bombs dropped in WWII contrasted against 6,667 tiny silhouettes representing the cur
rent collective nuclear arsenal of the world. The accompanying text included sobering statis
tics about the potential destructive power of the US and Soviet arsenals, encouraged people to
contact both President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev in support of upcoming summit talks,
and asked, “How long can we live with the arms race?”24
If Reagan’s hard line approach to the Cold War was terrifying to the people
in the freeze movement, it was reassuring to people who believed in his con
cept of a position of strength. In a letter to the President in 1984, Charls
Walker of the private interest group Committee on the Present Danger ex
pressed his support for Reagan and his policies:
As you have long recognized, bad arms control agreements are worse than
none at all. Equitable arms control agreements could play a part in insuring
U.S. security – but whether the Soviets are prepared to enter into equitable
agreements is subject to doubt. Today, with the military balance precarious
ly tipped against us, America’s security is directly dependent on growing
strength in our defense forces.25
The idea that “bad arms control agreements are worse than none at all” was shared by many,
but this concept holds inherent logical fallacies. This idea is a moralistic one, in which the US
only participates in the arms race in a reactive way, rather than as the first cause. If there is a
legally binding treaty, then both parties must answer to the letter of the law. But in the ab
sence of a treaty, value judgments rule the day, feeding the nuclear hysteria rather than foster
ing peaceful negotiation.
Many Congressmen, both Republicans and Democrats, recognized this problem, and
encouraged Reagan to make the necessary efforts to find common ground with Soviet leaders.
Republican Senator Larry Pressler wrote to Reagan, pleading, “we owe it to the world” to ne
gotiate, and that suspended talks “would not be in the interest of any nation.”26 Shortly thereaf
ter, a group of Democratic House Representatives encouraged Reagan to be less confronta
tional, and more diplomatic. They argued that it was, “in the interest of all mankind that seri
ous bilateral negotiations be resumed.”27
22 Graebner, et al, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, 32.
23 Graebner, et al, Reagan, Bush, Gorbachev, 33.
24 Letter, Joan B. Kroc to Ronald Reagan, July 12, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan
Library.
25 Letter, Charls E. Walker to Ronald Reagan, January 11, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
26 Letter, Larry Pressler to Ronald Reagan, November 25, 1983, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
27 Letter, Bill Green to Ronald Reagan, February 10, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
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A group of Republican Senators led by Malcolm Wallop and Jesse Helms cosigned
a letter to Reagan regarding the administration’s policy of recognizing the parameters of the
unratified SALT II treaty. They asked, “Shall you continue to abide unilaterally by treaties
and agreements that the Soviets have violated and that have expired anyhow? Unilateral com
pliance is unilateral disarmament.” These Senators argued for the negative, and they rejected
the titfortat strategy of matching Soviet treaty infractions. Wallop, Helms, and the others
agreed, “that option would give the Soviet Union control over what we do and don’t do, and,
above all, keep our defense planning within a framework that is fundamentally wrong.”28
Reagan, of course, agreed that a world free of nuclear weapons would be a world
much improved. Yet the reality was that no one, no matter how much power they wielded,
had the ability to simply call for the destruction of a nuclear arsenal. There were too many
overlapping interests involved, and always the balance of power to consider.
This point is perhaps best summed up by former diplomat Miles Copeland in his
seminal work, The Game of Nations. He writes, “when vital national interests are at stake,
and when it is a question of seeing them endangered or bowing to some high moral principle,
there is no question but that it is the high moral principle which will suffer.”29 The endangered
high moral principle in this case is that the mere existence of nuclear weapons is immoral.
The paradox is that if just one belligerent nation possesses nuclear weapons, it is immoral not
to possess them for your own nation. This paradox of politics and morals is as old as time. In
trying to serve the best interest of a nation in a world in which some other leaders behave im
morally, behaving morally may put you at a disadvantage, and therefore threatens the best
interest of your nation. Those who would behave immorally can manipulate predictable moral
behavior. Reagan confirmed as much in his State of the Union address in 1985, stating, “We
cannot play innocents abroad in a world that’s not innocent.” 30When it comes to the nuclear
arms race, behaving morally is immoral when you are in a position of power, unless and until
another nation has the capability of MAD, at which point morality once again takes over.
This kind of theoretical wordplay is difficult to impart to the masses when the consequences
of miscalculation could mean the end of civilization as they know it. Fear is much easier to
convey than reason. In looking across the oceans at one another, both nations saw danger.
The Mirror Image
The years between Reagan’s first election and the ascendancy of Gorbachev to Gen
eral Secretary were some of the darkest days of the Cold War. The atmosphere led many peo
ple to believe that escalation was the only constant, and that the cruel teleological path of a
nuclear arms race could only lead on one horrifying conclusion. Reflecting on the tension in
early 1980s, Gorbachev wrote, “This was a time when many people in the military and among
the political establishment regarded a war involving weapons of mass destruction as conceiva
ble and even acceptable, and were developing various scenarios of nuclear escalation.” 31In his
memoirs, Reagan recalled that, “I carried a small plasticcoated card with me, [which] listed
the codes I would issue to the Pentagon confirming that it was actually the president of the
United States who was ordering the unleashing of our nuclear weapons. The decision to
28 Letter, Malcolm Wallop to Ronald Reagan, June 4, 1985, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
29 Miles Copeland, The Game of Nations (New York: College Notes & Texts, Inc, 1969), 28.
30 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1985
Volume I (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1988), 135.
31 Mikhail Gorbachev, “The Nuclear Threat”, in Implications of the Reykjavik Summit on Its
Twentieth Anniversary, ed Sydney D. Drell and George P. Schultz (Stanford: Hoover Institu
tion, 2007), 9.
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launch the weapons was mine alone to make.”32
Assume for a moment that Reagan’s statement about being solely responsible for
ordering a nuclear strike is true, and that everyone from the top down would follow such an
order. If the Soviets withdrew their SS20s without some combination of threat or concession
from Washington, they would appear weak, and lose credibility in their reputation as hardlin
ers. In the absence of economic power, political will backed by military reputation is the
strongest feature of any government, and therefore indispensable. Whatever the NATO re
sponse would be to the SS20 deployment, short of nuclear war, Moscow could not blink. To
do so would indicate lessthantotal faith in the choice to deploy the SS20s. In the resulting
geopolitical atmosphere, every situation involving either the US or Soviet Union was highly
scrutinized and presented as proof of the others’ aggression or intransigence.
In the collaborative effort The Sword and the Shield, historian Christopher Andrew describes
the Soviet position early in the Reagan administration. Andrew writes, “In a secret speech to
a major KGB conference in May 1981, a visibly ailing Brezhnev denounced Reagan’s policies
as a serious threat to world peace.”33 At the same conference, KGB Director Yuri Andropov
announced operation RYAN (Raketno Yadernoye Napadenie, “Nuclear Missile Attack”).
Andrew continues, “RYAN’s purpose was to collect intelligence on the presumed, but non
existent, plans of the Reagan administration to launch a nuclear first strike against the Soviet
Union – a delusion which reflected both the KGB’s continuing failure to penetrate the policy
making of the Main Adversary and its recurrent tendency towards conspiracy theory.”34
By 1983, Brezhnev had passed away and Andropov was the new General Secretary.
Unfortunately, Andropov’s health upon entering office was not much of an improvement over
Brezhnev’s later years, and the paranoid view of Washington continued unabated. In describ
ing Andropov and the political climate of 1983, historian Vladislov Zubok writes, “On Sep
tember 29, Pravda published his ‘farewell address’ on SovietAmerican relations. Andropov
informed the Soviet people that the Reagan administration was set upon a dangerous course
‘to ensure a dominating position in the world for the United States of America.’”35 Previous to
his duties as General Secretary, Andropov had been the longest serving head of the KGB, and
he was well aware of the American government’s geopolitical strategy and capability. Based
on American actions, not words, Andropov made a good point.
For his part, Reagan was all too happy to play the insult game, and consistently de
rided the Soviet Union in public. In a speech to the British House of Commons, Reagan
warned that, “the march of freedom and democracy…will leave MarxismLeninism on the ash
heap of history.” 36 In his first term, Reagan famously labeled the Soviet Union an “evil em
pire” and warned people not to “remove yourself from the struggle between right and wrong
and good and evil.” 37George Kennan, the father of US containment policy called Reagan’s
views toward the Soviet Union “intellectual primitivism.”38
32 Ronald Reagan, An American Life (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1990), 257.
33 Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, The Sword and the Shield: The Mitrokhin Ar
chive and the Secret History of the KGB (New York: Basic Books, 1999), 213.
34 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, 213.
35 Vladislov Zubok, A Failed Empire: The Soviet Union in the Cold War from Stalin to Gor
bachev (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2007), 274.
36 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1982
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1983), 747.
37 Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1983
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1984), 364.
38 Mark A. Stoler, Ideology Anew, Read by author, The Teaching Company, 2008.
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Reagan also compared Soviet leaders to their most bitter of antagonists, the Nazis.
For the Soviets, the greatest source of national tragedy and pride was winning the “Great Patri
otic War.” In a March 1981 interview with Walter Cronkite, Reagan said, “I remember when
Hitler was arming and had built himself up – no one’s created quite the military power that the
Soviet Union has, but comparatively he was in that way.”39 It was not the only time Reagan
associated the Soviets with their World War II adversary. In a speech to Congress, Reagan
compared the Soviet communist influences in Central America and the Caribbean with Ger
man Uboats operating in the Gulf of Mexico during the early 1940s.40 In describing the cur
rent Soviet leadership as similar to Nazi leadership, Reagan was verbally salting the psychic
wounds incurred by millions of civilians. As one historian has noted, “Probably no American
policymaker at any time during the Cold War inspired quite as much fear and loathing in Mos
cow as Ronald Reagan during his first term as president.”41
The Year of Living Dangerously
In January 1983, Reagan made antagonizing the Soviets official policy when he
signed National Security Decision Directive 75 (NSDD 75), titled “US Relations with the
USSR.” NSDD 75 is the written representation of Reagan’s concept of a position of strength.
The policy calls for the US to challenge the Soviet Union militarily, subvert the authority of
the Kremlin within the USSR, and at the same time always extend an olive branch to negotiate
should the first two points aggravate Soviet leaders to the point of exhaustion on any particular
issue. 42
The most successful portion of this policy, and also potentially the most dangerous,
was its military strategy. In part, NSDD 75 reads:
The US must modernize its military forces – both nuclear and conventional
– so that the Soviet leaders perceive that the US is determined never to ac
cept a second place or a deteriorating military posture. Soviet calculations
of possible war outcomes under any contingency must always result in out
comes so unfavorable to the USSR that there would be no incentive for So
viet leaders to initiate an attack.43
This line of thinking is contingent upon two very precarious assumptions, the first of which is
being able to guess how Soviet leaders “perceive” a situation, and, second, what their
“calculations” might be if US policymakers correctly determined the answer to the first as
sumption. Reagan added to this policy in a statement to Congress in June 1985, when he said
it was necessary to, “make it clear to Moscow that violations of arms control obligations entail
real costs,” and that the US should continue with strategic modernization programs “as a
hedge against the military consequences of […] Soviet violations of existing arms agreements
which the Soviets fail to correct.”44
When the two doctrines are combined, the situation reads like this: if Washington
guesses wrong on Soviet perceptions of any given situation, and then Moscow reacts in a way
that US officials did not anticipate, then US officials reserve the right to respond in a titfortat
fashion based on the Soviet reaction, even though it was Washington’s failed model that al
39 Ronald Reagan, Public Papers of the President of the United States: Ronald Reagan, 1981
(Washington, DC: GPO, 1982), 194.
40 Reagan, PPP 1983, 601.
41 Andrew and Mitrokhin, Sword and the Shield, 242.
42 National Security Decision Directive Number 75, Federation of American Scientists,
http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsdd/index.html (accessed March 27, 2011).
43 National Security Decision Directive Number 75.
44 US Department of State, Building an Interim Framework for Mutual Restraint, Special
Report No. 131, June 10, 1985.
The Hilltop Review, Fall 2011

33

William D. Watson

lowed for the unanticipated reaction. This “miscalculation” portion of Kennedy’s 1961 warn
ing was a real possibility in 1983.
Growing concerns over the arms race combined with a brutal economic recession led
to very low public approval numbers for Reagan during this period. After two years in office,
the financial slowdown that Reagan had blamed on Carter was still lingering, which led some
to question whether or not incurring a large national debt to finance a military modernization
project was good policy. According to a Gallup Poll, Reagan began 1983 with a paltry 35%
approval rating.45 In July 1983, Republican Senator Arlen Spector addressed this concern in a
letter to one of Reagan’s national security assistants, William P. Clark. Regarding the pro
spects of a new arms control summit with the Soviets, Spector wrote:
Even if the summit did not produce an agreement, I do not believe it would
‘dash expectations,’ as some suggest. Rather, a meeting between the two
leaders would demonstrate that both nations are serious about arms control.
Such a demonstration is crucial, in my opinion, to maintaining public sup
port for our defense buildup, strategic modernization, including the MX
missile, and deployment of the Euromissiles.46
By taking this position, Specter was effectively arguing that, in a democracy, informed public
opinion is less desirable than manipulated public opinion. Specter felt that a mere façade of
good faith negotiations would be enough to drum up public support for the real bargaining
target of the administration: a position of strength.
The tension continued to rise into late summer of that year when a Soviet fighter pi
lot shot down Korean Airline Flight 007 over the Kamchatka peninsula in far eastern Russia.
KAL 007 had gone off course and mistakenly entered Russian air space. The fighter pilot did
not intend to kill civilians, and in fact thought he was shooting at an American military plane.
The US regularly probed Soviet radar defenses, including in the area around Kamchatka
where a major Soviet naval base was located. Tragically, after a series of technical and com
munications problems, in the black of night, the fighter pilot was ordered to shoot down the
plane. Only afterwards was the real identity of the craft known. Western journalists and poli
ticians alike criticized the attack as naked aggression, and a representation of the contempt for
human life held by leaders in Moscow.47
The timing could not have been worse. The KAL incident occurred in September,
followed by weeks of demagoguery in the press. In the midst of all the posturing, both public
and private, Reagan approved a ten day NATO military exercise called Able Archer ’83 from
November 2  11. Author David Hoffman explains:
The exercise, Able Archer ’83, was designed to practice the procedures for a
fullscale simulated release of nuclear weapons in a European conflict. The
Soviets had long feared that training exercises could be used as a disguise
for a real attack; their own war plans envisioned the same deception.48
Able Archer was exactly the kind of operation that RYAN was meant to detect and counter,
which only heightened tensions between the two nations, as well as the apprehensiveness of
45 Frank Newport, Jeffrey M. Jones, and Lydia Saad, “Ronald Reagan From the People’s
Perspective: A Gallup Poll Review,” Gallup News Service http://www.gallup.com/
poll/11887/ronaldreaganfrompeoplesperspectivegalluppollreview.aspx (accessed March
29, 2011).
46 Letter, Arlen Specter to William P. Clark, July 27, 1983, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald
Reagan Library.
47 David E. Hoffman, The Dead Hand: The Untold Story of the Cold War Arms Race and Its
Dangerous Legacy (New York: Doubleday, 2009), 94.
48 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 7279.
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European allies on both sides. In carrying out the exercise, NATO forces altered their message
formats and moved nonexistent forces to high alert status. KGB agents monitoring the com
munications and the exercise as a whole were shocked, and for a time believed that NATO was
on the precipice of a first strike against the Soviet Union.49cIn response, during the exercise,
the Soviet Fourth Air Army was also placed on an increased readiness level, and combat air
operations were called off for seven days in anticipation of NATO moves. Reagan was initial
ly scheduled to participate personally, but after word of Soviet and allied apprehension got to
the White House, he decided against it.50 The successful completion of a mocknuclear missile
attack only reinforced the idea that the scenario was a viable option for policymakers. Both
sides believed the other was capable of a first strike.
Despite the mounting fear and polarization caused by the events of 1983, Reagan still
clung to the NATO Dual Track policy, which necessitated Pershing II deployment. In re
sponse to a letter signed by sixteen Congressmen warning of the “increasingly dangerous”
situation, a White House aide wrote on behalf of the Reagan, that the “President believes that
making concessions just to get the Soviets back to the negotiations that they themselves broke
off would only encourage further intransigence.”51 Reagan’s negotiating policy never changed.
It was “no” to any proposal by the Soviet government that was less than the American starting
position. Gorbachev, on the other hand, was the first of the two leaders to act on the recogni
tion of both men that the exorbitant amount of time, money, and resources being used for an
international arms race could be of far better use within the borders of their own country. Gor
bachev believed the benefits to the Soviet Union from ending the arms race would outweigh
any security concerns inherent in disarmament. This recognition, and acceptance, is what
made Gorbachev so important in the INF Treaty negotiations.
Personality Goes a Long Way
The inability of Washington and Moscow to foster some level of trust between the
two governments in the early 1980s is clear. Both nations were scared of what they saw on the
other side of the world. The only reason that neither nation acted on their fear is the concept of
MAD. An American economist and professor, Thomas Schelling , articulated this point in his
book The Strategy of Conflict. Schelling wrote:
There is a difference between a balance of terror in which either side can
obliterate the other and one in which both sides can do it no matter who
strikes first. It is not the “balance” – the sheer equality or symmetry in the
situation – that constitutes mutual deterrence; it is the stability of the bal
ance. The balance is stable only when neither, in striking first, can destroy
the other’s ability to strike back.52
The choice by Soviet leaders to deploy SS20s within range of Western Europe, when taken
from the NATO point of view, upset the regional stability of that balance. Open criticism on
both sides, coupled with massive intelligence and military exercises like RYAN and Able
Archer, only served to exacerbate the imbalance and inflame fear of a nuclear confrontation.
Historian Melvyn Leffler explains, “Brezhnev had warned against another escalation of the
arms race and even offered to reduce the number of Soviet SS20s if the West would talk and
not act. But NATO leaders moved ahead on 12 December [1979], saying they were wiling to
49 James Mann, The Rebellion of Ronald Reagan: A History of the End of the Cold War
(New York: Viking, 2009), 7778.
50 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 95.
51 Letter, Lawrence Coughlin to Ronald Reagan, June 15, 1984 and Robert F. Turner to Law
rence Coughlin, July 10, 1984, WHORM: F006 03, Ronald Reagan Library.
52 Thomas C. Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict (Cambridge: Harvard University Press,
1980), 232.
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talk but would not stop their plans to deploy 464 groundlaunched Tomahawk cruise missiles
in Western Europe along with 108 Pershing II intermediaterange ballistic missiles. Brezhnev
and his colleagues were dismayed. The Americans were again seeking to negotiate from
strength.”53 Under Reagan, official US national security policy outlined in NSDD 75 meant
that, in reaction to the SS20 deployment, the only option for American policymakers was to
respond in kind, and move forward with the Pershing II production and deployment.
Even before he took office, this was a point which Gorbachev understood all too
well. In his memoirs, Gorbachev wrote:
The decision to deploy SS20 missiles in Eastern Europe had reflected the
style of the Soviet leadership at the time, decisionmaking fraught with
grave consequences for the country. I had arrived at the sad conclusion that
this step, fateful both for our country and Europe and for the rest of the
world, had been taken without the necessary political and strategic analysis
of its possible consequences. Whatever the arguments advanced at the time
to justify the deployment of such missiles, the Soviet leadership failed to
take into account the probable reaction of the Western countries. I would
even go so far as to characterize it as an unforgivable adventure, embarked
on by the previous Soviet leadership under pressure from the military
industrial complex. They might have assumed that, while we deployed our
missiles, Western countermeasures would be impeded by the peace move
ment. If so, such a calculation was more than naïve.54
In this single passage, Gorbachev demonstrates how history is never inevitable, but in hind
sight, can seem overdetermined. Before the NATO Dual Track policy of 1979, before NSDD
75 in 1983, and before Reagan’s statement to Congress in 1985, Gorbachev could see what he
felt was inevitable unfolding before his eyes. When Reagan took office, he not only upheld
the US agreement with NATO to respond directly to the SS20 deployment, he encouraged a
massive military buildup in order to show the Soviet leaders that he was happy to play the tit
fortat game. To Reagan’s great credit, by 1985, he was also willing to play titfortat on arms
reductions.
In this way, it really did take Gorbachev to break the cycle of counter deployments,
war scares, and paranoid living. Both Reagan and Gorbachev recognized the danger of per
petually testing the rationality of their governments in response to crisis. Unfortunately, Gor
bachev was not the General Secretary until three consecutive Soviet leaders died while in of
fice. As such, the possibility of continuity in already strained relations was made even more
difficult by the reality of human frailty. Between the time Reagan took office in January
1981 to the time Gorbachev took office in March 1985, Brezhnev, Andropov, and Constantine
Chernenko all passed away.
The rapid succession of Soviet leaders made it nearly impossible to build any kind of
rapport between Reagan and his Kremlin counterparts. The stability of relations between
Washington and Moscow was, from a certain point of view, dangerously reliant on the health
of two men at any given time. In both political philosophy and physical vitality, Gorbachev
represented a clear change within the Kremlin. At fiftyfour Gorbachev was easily the young
est member of the Politburo. When he became General Secretary, Gorbachev was thirteen
years younger than the average age of the voting membership.55 The INF Treaty is more than
53 Melvyn P. Leffler, For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, The Soviet Union, and the
Cold War (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 332
54 Mikhail Gorbachev, Memoirs (New York: Doubleday, 1996), 443444.
55 Hoffman, The Dead Hand, 187.
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just a document: it is the written embodiment of Gorbachev’s policies and personality, based
on a life spent in and out of the Soviet Union.
The INF Treaty
Treaties are contracts between nations, enforceable by war. In the nuclear age,
breaking a treaty could mean disaster for every living thing on Earth. MAD is the foundation
of the INF Treaty, and the foundation of MAD is rationality. Throughout the Cold War both
governments tested the rationality of their policymakers by practicing brinksmanship. The
Korean War, Taiwan Straits Crisis, Cuban Missile Crisis, and even Able Archer were all tests
of rationality, which thankfully both governments continued to pass, at least on a macro level.
Following this analogy, if MAD is the foundation of the INF Treaty, then verification
is the framework. As noted above, both threats and promises are strategic moves in a “game
of nations.” But strategic moves, by definition, must also be decisions that a player, or in this
case a national government, would not normally make. Initiating MAD is not in the best in
terest of a rational policymaker, and is therefore a credible threat.
The promise to eliminate nuclear weapons altogether is also something that a rational
policymaker would not normally do, in part, because the United States and Soviet Union were
not the only two nations with nuclear weapons. Although the INF Treaty is bilateral, the pa
rameters take into consideration the global balance necessary beyond their own national inter
ests. Most notably at the time, China, India, Pakistan, and Israel also possessed nuclear weap
ons. It would not be in the best interest of either the US or Soviet Union to completely dis
mantle their nuclear arsenal in a world where the lack of such weapons would be a geopoliti
cal disadvantage.
The agreement by Reagan and Gorbachev that nuclear war could not be won only
reinforced what generations of leaders before them understood. This can be confirmed by
analyzing the INF preamble. The treaty reads:
The United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
hereinafter referred to as the Parties, Conscious that nuclear war would have
devastating consequences for all mankind, Guided by the objective of
strengthening strategic stability, Convinced that the measures set forth in
this Treaty will help reduce the risk of outbreak of war and strengthen inter
national peace and security, and Mindful of their obligations under Article
VI of the Treaty on the NonProliferation of Nuclear Weapons, have agreed
as follows:56
While both Parties agreed that nuclear war would be terrible for all people, they are not nego
tiating the elimination of all nuclear weapons. They are negotiating a “strategic stability”
which will “reduce the risk” of nuclear confrontation. By eliminating short and medium range
missiles from their arsenals, both Parties reduced the amount of contingencies available to
policymakers who would otherwise consider nuclear war a possibility.
The INF Treaty is also loaded with language that speaks to the paranoid atmosphere
that came to a crescendo during Reagan’s first term. Article V, Section Three reads:
Shorterrange missiles and launchers of such missiles shall not be located at
the same elimination facility. Such facilities shall be separated by no less

56 “Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
on the Elimination of their IntermediateRange and ShorterRange Missiles,” December 8,
1987, http://dosfan.lib.uic.edu/acda/treaties/inf2.htm (accessed December 10, 2010).
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than 1000 kilometers.57

This provision is especially important because of the content found in the Memorandum of
Understanding, which accompanies the INF treaty. The Memorandum contains a list of de
ployment areas and missile operating bases, complete with latitude and longitude locations.
The location information makes targeting such facilities a matter of data entry. This infor
mation could be utilized to plan a first strike against the other party. If policymakers believed
a first strike based on the location information, in combination with the capability of non
theater weapons to take out ICBM locations, were likely to result in the inability of the enemy
to retaliate, then it would be rational to attack. By outlawing the possibility of a confluence of
weapons in one theatre, the possibility of achieving a first strike advantage is lost, thereby
maintaining balance.
Further proof of distrust is evident in Article XII, which deals with interference and
obfuscation. Article XII, Section Two reads:
Neither Party shall:
(a) interfere with national technical means of verification of the other Party
operating in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article; or
(b) use concealment measures which impede verification of compliance
with the provisions of this Treaty by national technical means of verification
carried out in accordance with paragraph 1 of this Article.58
Both Washington and Moscow were clearly concerned that their track records regarding espi
onage might reveal themselves in manipulating the verification process. If it could be proven
that either side chose to act contrary to the provisions of this section, the treaty would be bro
ken, and another escalation of nuclear tension would be likely to occur. Neither party wanted
such an outcome, but the only way to enforce such a rule is embodied in the spirit of the treaty
to begin with. That is, the point of the treaty is to reduce nuclear tension and the possibility of
war, but only if sufficient nonEuropean theatre ICBMs are held in escrow.
The escrow of ICBMs is guaranteed by one simple concept: the elimination of all
nuclear weapons in the world does not preclude the ability to rearm. Because of the risk in
volved in complete bilateral disarmament, and the cost in time and money to rearm, it is not
rational to eliminate all nuclear weapons from a national arsenal unless and until all nuclear
weapons are banned and destroyed under unanimous international verification treaties. It is
only rational to hold as many weapons as is absolutely necessary to deter a first strike attempt
against a government’s own retaliatory capabilities. This was the goal of both Reagan and
Gorbachev. The verification promises in the INF Treaty, backed up by nuclear capabilities in
escrow, ensured that the only rational choice for both Reagan and Gorbachev would be to sign
the treaty and reap the moral and political benefits.
To further guarantee that the treaty could not be superseded, Article XIV reads: “The
Parties shall comply with this Treaty and shall not assume any international obligations or
undertakings which would conflict with its provisions.” 59 The INF was given mostfavored
treaty status.
Regarding the internal debate between Haig and Weinberger, they both got what they
wanted. Haig’s argument that the Soviet government would not negotiate until they faced a
credible threat proved to be true. But Weinberger got what he wanted with the promise of
verification. The NATO Dual Track policy was vindicated. By deploying the Pershing II
57 “INF Treaty”, Article V Section 3.
58 “INF Treaty”, Article XII, Section 2.
59 “INF Treaty”, Article XIV.
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missiles to Western Europe, and simultaneously extending the offer of bilateral arms reduc
tion, Reagan gave the Soviets incentive to remove the SS20s. Agreement on verification did
eliminate INF weapons from the European theatre, thereby returning the Cold War to the dé
tente era status quo of proxy wars and interventionism. This allowed Reagan to maintain the
policies of NSDD 75 without fear of nuclear confrontation. The strategic modernization pro
cess, in combination with the INF Treaty, meant that the US had achieved unquestioned mili
tary hegemony in the world, confirming Reagan’s vision of a position of strength.
The INF Treaty was signed in the East room of the White House on December 8,
1987. In time, the treaty led to the elimination of 1,846 Soviet SS20s, and 846 American
Pershing IIs. At the signing, Reagan said, “We have listened to the wisdom of an old Russian
maxim, doveryai, no proveryai – trust, but verify.”
“You repeat that at every meeting,” Gorbachev replied.
“I like it,” Reagan said, smiling.60
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